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During negotiations, anger disrupts the process by reducing the level of trust, clouding parties' judgment, narrowing parties' focus of attention and changing their central goal from reaching agreement to retaliating against the other side. Research indicates that negotiator's emotions do not necessarily affect the negotiation process. According to this model, emotions affect negotiations only when one is high and the other is low. When both ability and motivation are low, the affect is identified, and when both are high the affect is identified but discounted as irrelevant to judgment.

Most studies on emotion in negotiations focus on the effect of the negotiator's own emotions on the process. However, what the other party feels might be just as important, as group emotions are known to affect processes both at the group and the personal levels. When it comes to negotiations, trust in the other party is a necessary condition for its emotion to affect, [51] and visibility enhances the effect.

Specific emotions were found to have different effects on the opponent's feelings and strategies chosen:. Negotiation is a rather complex interaction. Capturing all its complexity is a very difficult task, let alone isolating and controlling only certain aspects of it.

For this reason most negotiation studies are done under laboratory conditions, and focus only on some aspects. Although lab studies have their advantages, they do have major drawbacks when studying emotions:. While negotiations involving more than two parties is less often researched, some results from two-party negotiations still apply with more than two parties.

One such result is that in negotiations it is common to see language similarity arise between the two negotiating parties. In three-party negotiations, language similarity still arose, and results were particularly efficient when the party with the most to gain from the negotiation adopted language similarities from the other parties. Due to globalization and growing business trends, negotiation in the form of teams is becoming widely adopted.

Teams can effectively collaborate to break down a complex negotiation. There is more knowledge and wisdom dispersed in a team than in a single mind. Writing, listening, and talking, are specific roles team members must satisfy. The capacity base of a team reduces the amount of blunder, and increases familiarity in a negotiation. However, unless a team can appropriately utilize the full capacity of its potential, effectiveness can suffer.

One factor in the effectiveness of team negotiation is a problem that occurs through solidarity behavior. Solidarity behavior occurs when one team member reduces his or her own utility benefit in order to increase the benefits of other team members. This behavior is likely to occur when interest conflicts rise.

Intuitively, this may feel like a cooperative approach. However, though a team may aim to negotiate in a cooperative or collaborative nature, the outcome may be less successful than is possible, especially when integration is possible.

Integrative potential is possible when different negotiation issues are of different importance to each team member. Integrative potential is often missed due to the lack of awareness of each member's interests and preferences. Ultimately, this leads to a poorer negotiation result. Thus, a team can perform more effectively if each member discloses his or her preferences prior to the negotiation.

This step will allow the team to recognize and organize the team's joint priorities, which they can take into consideration when engaging with the opposing negotiation party. Because a team is more likely to discuss shared information and common interests, teams must make an active effort to foster and incorporate unique viewpoints from experts from different fields. Research by Daniel Thiemann, which largely focused on computer-supported collaborative tasks, found that the Preference Awareness method is an effective tool for fostering the knowledge about joint priorities and further helps the team judge which negotiation issues were of highest importance.

Many of the strategies in negotiation vary across genders, and this leads to variations in outcomes for different genders, often with women experiencing less success in negotiations as a consequence. This is due to a number of factors, including that it has been shown that it is more difficult for women to be self-advocating when they are negotiating. Many of the implications of these findings have strong financial impacts in addition to the social backlash faced by self-advocating women in negotiations, as compared to other advocating women, self-advocating men, and other advocating men.

Research in this area has been studied across platforms, in addition to more specific areas like women as physician assistants. This research has been supported by multiple studies, including one which evaluated candidates participating in a negotiation regarding compensation. This study showed that women who initiated negotiations were evaluated more poorly than men who initiated negotiations. In another variation of this particular setup, men and women evaluated videos of men and women either accepting a compensation package or initiating negotiations.

Men evaluated women more poorly for initiating negotiations, while women evaluated both men and women more poorly for initiating negotiations. In this particular experiment, women were less likely to initiate a negotiation with a male, citing nervousness, but there was no variation with the negotiation was initiated with another female. Research also supports the notion that the way individuals respond in a negotiation varies depending on the gender of the opposite party. In all-male groups, the use of deception showed no variation upon the level of trust between negotiating parties, however in mixed-sex groups there was an increase in deceptive tactics when it was perceived that the opposite party was using an accommodating strategy.

In all-female groups, there were many shifts in when individuals did and did not employ deception in their negotiation tactics. The academic world contains a unique management system, wherein faculty members, some of which have tenure, reside in academic units e. However, the academic environment frequently presents with situations where negotiation takes place. For example, many faculty are hired with an expectation that they will conduct research and publish scholarly works. And deans oversee colleges where they must optimize limited resources, such as research space or operating funds while at the same time creating an environment that fosters student success, research accomplishments and more.

Integrative negotiation is the type predominately found in academic negotiation — where trust and long-term relationships between personnel are valued. Techniques found to be particularly useful in academic settings include: [71] [72] 1 doing your homework — grounding your request in facts; 2 knowing your value; 3 listening actively and acknowledging what is being said, [74] 4 putting yourself in their shoes, 5 asking — negotiation begins with an ask, 6 not committing immediately, 7 managing emotion and 8 keeping in mind the principle of a "wise agreement", [74] with its associated emphasis on meeting the interests of both parties to the extent possible as a key working point.

The articles by Callahan, et al. The word "negotiation" originated in the early 15th century from the Old French negociacion from Latin negotiatio from neg - "no" and otium "leisure". By the late s negotiation had the definition, "to communicate in search of mutual agreement.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Dialogue intended to reach an agreement. For Wikipedia's negotiation policy, see Wikipedia:Negotiation. For other uses, see Negotiation disambiguation. See also: Zero-sum game. See also: Non-zero-sum game and Win-win game. Main article: Nonverbal communication.

Alternative dispute resolution Alternating offers protocol Collaborative software Collective action Conciliation Conflict resolution research Consistency negotiation Contract Cross-cultural Cross-cultural differences in decision-making Diplomacy Dispute resolution Expert determination Flipism Game theory Impasse International relations Leadership Multilateralism Nash equilibrium Principled negotiation Prisoner's dilemma Program on Negotiation Delaying tactic.

In Zartman, I William ed. Negotiation, or the art of Negotiating. United States: Doubleday Anchor. Patton, Bruce ed. New York: Penguin Books. JosseyBass, 2nd ed. Bargaining for Advantage. United States: Penguin. Prospect Theory and Negotiation.

State Strategies in International Bargaining - Heather Elko McKibben - Google книги

Germany: Springer. Creative Experience. United States: P Smith. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in. Penguin: New York. Negotiating with Giants. United States: Negotiation Press. Pages 4 to 5. Titan, The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr. United States: Penguin Random House. Pages to Page 4. Page Retrieved 24 August Gilbert, Susan T. Negotiation Tactics.

10 Hard-Bargaining Tactics to Watch Out for in a Negotiation

Maryland: University Press of America. Journal of Organizational Behavior. Bargaining for advantage. The International Journal of Conflict Management. Group dynamics. Wadsworth Pub Co. The Negotiation Book. Washington, D. I would like to report this offer Please select a reason for reporting this offer.

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Finally, Article 2 1 of Convention No. In practical terms, it seems somewhat unlikely that trade unions would or could effectively interfere with the internal functioning of employer organizations. This possibility finds express recognition in Article 2 2 :. For the guarantees set out in Conventions Nos. This logic finds recognition in Article 1 1 of Convention No. Such protection shall apply more particularly in respect of acts calculated to:. Not only must there be comprehensive protection against anti-union discrimination as defined, but by virtue of Article 3 of Convention No. Legal standards are inadequate if they are not coupled with effective and expeditious procedures and with sufficiently dissuasive penal sanctions to ensure their application Legislation which allows the employer in practice to terminate the employment of a worker on condition that he pay the compensation provided for by law in any case of unjustified dismissal Legislation should also provide effective means for implementing means of compensation, with the reinstatement of the dismissed worker, including retroactive compensation, being the most appropriate remedy in such cases of anti-union discrimination ILO b.

The guarantee set out in Article 4 of Convention No. Article 4 has not, however, been interpreted as protecting the right to recognition for purposes of collective bargaining. They have justified this interpretation on the basis that compulsory recognition would deprive collective bargaining of its voluntary character as envisaged by Article 4 ILO a.

As against that, it might be argued that the ostensible right to engage in collective bargaining must inevitably be compromised if employers are to be free to refuse to engage in such bargaining notwithstanding that they have the right so to bargain if they wish. It was suggested earlier that ILO standards relating to occupational safety and health endorse the concept of bipartite or tripartite involvement in three principal contexts: 1 the formulation and implementation of policy at national and regional level; 2 consultation between employers and workers at the level of the workplace; and 3 joint participation between employers and workers in the formulation and implementation of policy at the level of the workplace.

It should be clear from the foregoing that the effective involvement of employers and especially workers in all three contexts is crucially dependent upon adequate recognition of their rights of association and representation. Respect for the right to form and to join organizations is clearly an essential precondition of all three forms of joint involvement. Consultation and participation at the governmental level is feasible only where there are strong and effective organizations which can be seen to be representative of the interests of their constituencies.

This is necessary both for ease of communication and so that government will feel constrained to take seriously the views expressed by the representatives of employers and workers. A fortiori, consultation and participation at the level of the workplace is a realistic proposition only if workers have the capacity to form and to join organizations which can represent their interests in discussions with employers and their organizations, provide back-up resources for worker representatives, assist in dealings with public inspectorates and so on.

Theoretically, worker representatives could operate at the level of the workplace without having any necessary connection with a more broadly based organization, but the reality of power relations in most workplaces is such that they are unlikely to be able to do so in an effective manner without the support of an industrial organization. At the very least, workers must have the right to have their interests represented in this manner if they so choose. The organizational autonomy of employer and worker organizations is also an essential precondition of meaningful participation at all levels.

It is necessary, for example, that worker organizations should have the right to formulate and to implement their policies on occupational safety and health issues without outside interference, for purposes of consultation with government in relation to: 1 issues such as the legal regulation of hazardous processes or substances; or 2 the formulation of legislative policy relating to compensation for work-related injury or the rehabilitation of injured workers.

Such autonomy is even more important at the level of the workplace, where worker organizations need to develop and maintain a capacity to represent the interests of their members in discussion with employers on occupational safety and health issues. To be effective, organizational autonomy also requires that trade union members and officials be accorded adequate protection against victimization on grounds of their trade union membership or activities, or on account of their having initiated or participated in legal proceedings relating to occupational safety and health matters.

In other words, the guarantees against discrimination set out in Article 1 of Convention No. The right to engage in autonomous collective bargaining is also a crucial element in effective worker participation in relation to occupational safety and health. The guarantees set out in Article 4 of Convention No. However, as indicated, those guarantees do not extend to the right to be recognized for purposes of such bargaining. This in turn serves to emphasize yet again the importance of adequate recognition of rights of association and representation as a precondition of the development and implementation of effective occupational safety and health strategies at both the national and enterprise level.

Traditionally, the subjects of the negotiation are wages, benefits, working conditions and fair treatment. However, collective bargaining can also address issues that do not directly affect the workers employed in the enterprise, such as increased old-age pensions for workers already retired. Less often, collective bargaining addresses issues that reach well beyond the workplace, such as protection of the external environment.

In a very small enterprise, it is possible for all the workers to negotiate as a body with their employer. This kind of informal collective bargaining has existed for centuries. The definition used in the ILO Convention concerning the promotion of collective bargaining, No. Collective bargaining is an important tool for raising living standards and improving working conditions. Even though safety and health is addressed in the national law of almost all countries, collective bargaining often provides the mechanism through which the law is implemented in the workplace.

Unfortunately, collective bargaining is under attack by authoritarian employers and repressive governments, both in developed and developing countries. It rarely exists in the informal sector or in small, traditional enterprises. In , Percival Pott, an English surgeon, made the first known report of occupational cancer — skin cancer in London chimney sweeps Lehman However, safety and health seldom was an explicit issue in early labour struggles. Workers in dangerous jobs were overwhelmed by more pressing problems, such as low wages, crushing hours of work and the arbitrary power of factory and mine owners.

Safety hazards were obvious in the daily toll of injury and death, but occupational health was not well understood. As a result, the grievances of nineteenth-century workers rarely manifested themselves in campaigns for safer conditions Corn The agreement between Bethlehem Steel and the United Steelworkers of America is typical of company-wide agreements in large unionized manufacturing enterprises in the United States.

Steel industry labour agreements have contained safety and health articles for more than 50 years. Many provisions negotiated in the past gave workers and the union rights that were later guaranteed by law. Despite this redundancy, the provisions still appear in the contract as a hedge against changes in the law, and to allow the union the option of taking violations to impartial arbitration rather than the courts. The Bethlehem agreement runs from 1 August to 1 August It covers 17, workers in six plants.

The full agreement is pages long; 17 pages are devoted to safety and health. Section 1 of the safety and health article pledges the company and the union to cooperate in the objective of eliminating accidents and health hazards. It obligates the company to provide safe and healthful workplaces, obey federal and state law, provide employees with the necessary protective equipment free of charge, provide chemical safety information to the union and inform workers of the hazards and controls for toxic substances.

The section also specifies how disputes over protective equipment are to be resolved, requires the company to notify the union of all potentially disabling accidents, sets up a system of joint accident investigation, requires the company to gather and supply to the union certain safety and health statistics, and establishes an extensive safety and health training programme for all employees. Under this provision, a worker cannot be disciplined for acting in good faith and on the basis of objective evidence, even if a subsequent investigation shows that the hazard did not in fact exist.

Section 5 states that alcoholism and drug abuse are treatable conditions, and sets up a programme of rehabilitation. Section 6 establishes an extensive programme for controlling carbon monoxide, a serious hazard in primary steel production. Section 8 requires the company to keep individual medical records confidential except in certain limited circumstances.

However, workers have access to their own medical records, and may release them to the union or to a personal physician. In addition, physicians for the company are required to notify workers of adverse medical findings. Section 10 establishes a programme for investigating and controlling the hazards of video display terminals. Section 11 establishes full-time safety representatives in each plant, chosen by the union but paid by the company. Fixed rail equipment is the leading cause of death by traumatic injury in the American steel industry.

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However, safety and health sometimes joined other issues in early labour struggles. In the late s, workers in the textile industry in the United States began to agitate for shorter working hours. Many of the workers were women, as were the leaders of such rudimentary unions as the female labour reform associations of New England. The proposed hour day was seen mostly as an issue of general welfare. They had little success in winning recognition from the mill owners, or action from the legislature Foner Other union actions dealt more with the effects of occupational hazards than with their prevention.

Many nineteenth-century unions adopted welfare programmes for their members, including disability payments to the injured and benefits for survivors. US and Canadian mining unions went one step further, establishing hospitals, clinics and even cemeteries for their members Derickson While unions attempted to negotiate better conditions with employers, most agitation for safety and health in North America was in mines aimed at state and provincial legislatures Fox The Factory Workers Union of Germany had an active industrial hygiene programme by , published education materials on chemical hazards and began a campaign for safeguards against chromate-induced lung cancer, ultimately leading to a change in the production method.

Their work showed the interplay between collective bargaining for safety and health and the factory inspection system. In , for example, trade unions filed complaints with the British factory inspectorate Teleky The agreement has been revised and extended several times; in the original parties were joined by the Federation of Salaried Employees Joint Industrial Safety Council of Sweden North America lagged behind. Formal corporate safety programmes were instituted by some large employers around the turn of the century for a description of such programmes in the steel industry see Brody , or the self-congratulatory Year Book of the American Iron and Steel Institute for AISI The programmes were highly paternalistic, relied more on discipline than education and often were based on the premise that workers themselves were largely to blame for industrial accidents.

However, safety and health as a widespread labour issue came only with the rise of strong unions in the s and s. In , for example, the founding Constitution of the United Steelworkers of America required every local union to establish a safety and health committee. By the mids, joint labour-management safety and health committees had been established in most unionized mines and manufacturing plants and in many other workplaces in the construction and service sector; most union contracts included a section on safety and health.

This kind of bargaining presupposes a succession of demands or proposals, counterproposals and extended deliberations. The process can produce a variety of results: a collective bargaining contract, letters of understanding, joint declarations or mutually agreed codes of practice. However, collective bargaining can also be understood as a continuous process for solving problems as they arise. This kind of collective bargaining occurs every time a shop steward meets with an area supervisor to settle a dispute or grievance, every time a joint safety and health committee meets to discuss problems in the plant, every time a joint union-management team considers a new company programme.

It is this flexibility of collective bargaining which helps ensure its continued viability. There is, however, one precondition for formal or informal bargaining: for negotiations to be a success, the representatives of both sides must have the authority to bargain and to strike a deal that is meant to be honoured.

Collective bargaining is sometimes seen as a test of strength, in which a gain for one side is a loss for the other. A wage increase, for example, is seen as a threat to profits. If bargaining is seen as a contest, it follows that the most important determinant of the final outcome is the relative power of the parties. Of course, the vast majority of labour negotiations end successfully, without a work stoppage. Nevertheless, it is the threat of one that leads both sides to seek a settlement. This kind of negotiation is sometimes called positional bargaining, because it begins with each side taking a position, after which both sides move by increments until a compromise is reached, based on their relative strengths.

A second model of collective bargaining describes it as a mutual search for an optimum solution Fisher and Ury This kind of bargaining assumes that a proper agreement can lead to gains for both parties. A wage increase, for example, can be offset by greater productivity. A no-layoff agreement can encourage workers to improve efficiency, since their jobs will not be threatened as a result.

What is most important is the ability of each side to understand the interests of the other and to find solutions that maximize both. Occupational safety and health is frequently seen as an ideal subject for mutual gains bargaining, since both sides are interested in avoiding occupational accidents and disease. In practice, these models of bargaining are not mutually exclusive and both are important.

Skilled bargainers will always seek to understand their counterparts and search for areas where both sides can benefit from a wise agreement. However, it is unlikely that a party without power will accomplish its objectives. There will always remain areas where the parties perceive their interests to be different. Good faith negotiation works best when both sides fear the alternative. Power is important even in negotiations over safety and health. An enterprise may be less interested in reducing the accident rate if it can externalize the cost of the accidents. If injured workers can be replaced easily and cheaply, without substantial compensation, management may be tempted to avoid expensive safety improvements.

This is especially true in the case of occupational diseases with long latency periods, where cost of controls is paid when the controls are installed, while the benefits may not accrue for many years. Of course, the legal basis for collective bargaining, the level at which bargaining occurs and even the process of bargaining all vary by country. The legislation of most industrialized countries includes a system for regulating collective bargaining.

Even within Europe, the degree of regulation can differ widely, from a minimal approach in Germany to a much more developed one in France. The legal effect of a collective agreement also varies. It is expected that this variability within Europe will diminish as a result of greater European unification. The level of bargaining also varies. At the other extreme, Austria, Belgium and the Nordic countries tend to have highly centralized bargaining in which most workplaces are subject to a framework agreement negotiated between national federations representing unions and employers.

Sectoral agreements covering particular industries or occupations are common in some countries such as Germany and France. French-speaking African countries tend to follow the example of France and bargain by industry. Some English-speaking developing countries also bargain by industry. In others, multiple trade unions bargain on behalf of different groups of workers in a single enterprise. The level of bargaining partially determines the coverage of collective agreements. In France and Germany, for example, collective agreements are usually extended to cover everyone coming within the scope of the occupation or industry to which the agreement applies.

On the other hand, in the United States and other countries with enterprise-level bargaining, collective agreements cover only those workplaces where the union has been recognized as the bargaining agent. An even more important factor in determining the coverage of collective bargaining is whether national law facilitates or impedes unionization and collective bargaining. For example, public sector employees are not permitted to bargain collectively in some countries. In others, public sector unions are growing rapidly. As a result of such factors, the percentage of workers covered by collective agreements varies from a high of almost 90 per cent in Germany and the Nordic countries to under 10 per cent in many developing countries.

The legal framework also affects how collective bargaining applies to occupational safety and health. Many countries go further.


Most industrialized countries require most enterprises to establish joint safety and health committees. The Canadian Province of Ontario requires that certified safety and health representatives be chosen by the workers in most workplaces and given a standard course of training at employer expense. The Swedish Work Environment Act requires the appointment of safety delegates by the local trade union organization.

Swedish safety delegates have broad rights to information and consultation. Most important, they have the power to suspend dangerous work pending a review by the Swedish Labour Inspectorate. These laws strengthen the collective bargaining process on issues of safety and health. Mandatory joint safety committees provide a routine mechanism for negotiation. Training gives union representatives the knowledge they need to participate effectively.

The right to suspend dangerous work helps keep both parties focused on eliminating the source of danger. Of course, labour agreements are of limited value without an enforcement mechanism. However, most labour agreements in developed countries rely on less disruptive methods of enforcement. In fact, many labour agreements bar strikes or lockouts during the life of the agreement no-strike clauses or peace obligations. Some restrict them to a limited set of circumstances; for example, the contracts negotiated in the United States between the United Automobile Workers and the major auto companies allow strikes over unsafe working conditions, but not over wages or benefits during the term of the agreement.

In some cases, disputes may be resolved by the judicial system, either in the regular courts or in special labour courts or boards. In the United States, for example, a dispute over contract interpretation usually will go to arbitration. A quasi-judicial body in the United States, the National Labor Relations Board, hears complaints concerning unfair labour practices, such as the failure of one side to bargain in good faith.

In many other countries, labour courts fulfil this role. Collective bargaining is a dynamic process in all industrial relations systems where it is practised. The situation in Europe is changing rapidly. The Nordic countries are characterized by comprehensive working environment agreements negotiated on a national basis, integrated with highly developed national laws. Unionization is very high; labour agreements and the law establish joint committees and worker safety representatives in most workplaces.

Collective bargaining mechanisms for safety and health and unionization rates, are less extensive in other European countries. Member States of the European Union face the task of harmonizing national laws under the Single European Act and the Framework Directive on safety and health Hecker European trade unions are seeking to coordinate their efforts, primarily through the European Trade Union Confederation.

There are some signs that national bargaining ultimately will be replaced or, more likely, supplemented by agreements at the European level, although employer resistance to this is high. The first example of such Europe-wide bargaining was over parental leave. Central and Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union, are changing even more rapidly.

Safety and health regulations were extensive under Communism, but rarely enforced. Trade unions existed, but only under the control of the Communist Party. At the enterprise level, unions functioned as workplace labour relations departments, under the control of management, without any sort of bipartite negotiation. Newly formed independent unions helped precipitate the fall of Communism; sometimes their issues concerned working conditions or such basic sanitary measures as the provision of soap in coal mine wash houses.

Today, the old unions are gone or are struggling to reconstitute themselves. The new independent unions are attempting to change from political organizations confronting the government, to collective bargaining organizations representing their members in the workplace. Bad and often deteriorating working conditions will continue to be an important issue.

The Japanese system of worker participation, continuous improvement and extensive training effectively promotes safety and health, but only where safety and health are explicit goals of the enterprise. Most Japanese unions exist only at the enterprise level; negotiations take place through a system of continuous joint consultation Inohara Joint safety and health committees are established by the Labour Safety and Sanitation Law of , as amended. Labour agreements in the United States contain relatively extensive safety and health articles for two reasons.

However, safety and health laws in the United States lack many of the provisions found in the laws of other countries, forcing unions to bargain for rights and protections guaranteed elsewhere by law. For example, joint union-management safety and health committees are generally recognized as an important mechanism for day-to-day cooperation and negotiation between workers and employers. As a result, unions must bargain for them. And since the rate of unionization is low in the United States, most workers do not have access to joint committees.

Many unions in the United States also have negotiated contract clauses barring retaliation against workers who refuse to work under abnormally hazardous conditions, since legal protections are weak and uncertain. Canadian law varies from province to province, although it is generally stronger than in the United States. For example, unions in Canada do not need to negotiate for the existence of safety and health committees, although they may negotiate for larger ones, with more powers.

Safety and health committees are also required under Mexican law. The situation in developing countries is mixed. Zimbabwean law has since provided for safety committees, health and safety representatives and health and safety supervisors at all workplaces. The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions has insisted that worker health and safety representatives must be elected by workers.

Its National Campaign covers these demands:. Safe work. This involves identification of workplace hazards through surveys and accident investigation, as well as negotiating to improve conditions. Adequate compensation and care for injured workers. This extends to a review of compensation levels. Job security for injured workers. Trade union representatives have negotiated a right to return to work and be assisted in placement. For the ZCTU, a key step in accident prevention has been its training programme to increase effective worker participation in health and safety at the shop floor level.

The training for worker representatives has been in carrying out walk-through surveys at workplaces and in reporting on any hazards identified — first to workers and then to management for discussion. Once in operation, union health and safety representatives have been involved in inspections and in ensuring that injuries are reported.

This is particularly important in sectors that would otherwise be inaccessible, such as agriculture. The ZCTU has also demanded an increase in penalties that may be imposed on employers found to have infringed health and safety laws. Virtually all collective bargaining takes place at the enterprise, industry or national level. In contrast, the economy is increasingly global. Such bargaining is a top priority for international labour federations.

It can best be promoted through stronger and more effective international union structures, strong social clauses in world trade agreements and appropriate international instruments, such as those of the International Labour Organization. For example, the ILO Tripartite Declaration on Multinational Enterprises refers specifically to both collective bargaining and occupational safety and health. Many unions are developing direct links with their counterparts in other countries in order to coordinate their bargaining and provide mutual assistance.

One example is the relationship between mining unions in the United States and Colombia Zinn Rapid changes in technology and work organization can overwhelm existing labour agreements. Some unions have begun to address issues of the external environment in their collective bargaining agreements and in their membership education programmes.

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A fundamental purpose of trade unions is to take human rights and human welfare out of economic competition — to prevent an enterprise or a nation from seeking a competitive advantage by impoverishing its workers and forcing them to work under dangerous conditions. Collective bargaining is vital to safety and health. Cooperation between workers, employers and government in the elaboration and implementation of occupational health and safety measures at the national or regional level is common in a significant number of countries.

It is not unusual for interest groups and technical experts also to be involved in this process. Such cooperation is highly developed and has been institutionalized in a number of countries by the establishment of consultative and collaborative organizations. These organizations have normally been widely accepted by all labour market participants as there appears to be a general consensus that health and safety at work is a subject of common concern where dialogue between the social partners, the government and other interested parties is extremely important.

The institutions which have been established to facilitate this cooperation vary significantly in form. One approach is to establish consultative organizations either on an ad hoc or a permanent basis to give advice to the government on questions of occupational safety and health policy. The government is normally not obligated to follow the recommendations offered, but in practice they are difficult to ignore and are frequently taken into consideration in the elaboration of government policy.

The other approach is to have the social partners and other interested parties actively cooperate with the government in public institutions which have been established to implement occupational safety and health policy. Bodies at the national level or regional, state or provincial level are normally complemented by structures or arrangements at the industry, enterprise and plant level. Probably the most common form of cooperation involves the establishment of consultative organizations to give advice on policy and standard setting.

Examples of this can vary between a modest approach, which involves the expenditure of relatively few resources, to more institutionalized approaches, which involve more significant amounts of resources. The United States is an example of a country where a more limited approach has been adopted.